# On the Development and Deployment of Cyberwarfare II

- Author: Kojin Glick
- Published: 2022-04-07
- Canonical: https://www.kojinglick.com/blog/on-the-development-and-deployment-of-cyberwarefare-II

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On April 2nd, one of the world's largest wind turbine manufacturers, Nordex, was hit by a cyberattack. The German company's response took down most of its critical infrastructure down, [in what some cybersecurity professionals identify as a telltale sign of ransomware](https://www.securityweek.com/wind-turbine-giant-nordex-shuts-down-it-systems-response-cyberattack). Although neither the company nor national agencies attribute the attack to any actor in particular, geopolitical indicators point to a connection to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Regardless of who might be behind the attack, this attack highlights the unique strategic role that cybersecurity will play moving forward.

One of the most pressing implications of the Ukraine-Russia conflict is the future of European energy security. To keep this description brief, Europeans rely disproportionately on cheap Russian natural gas, and the continued domestic pressures to move away from producing alternative sources of energy like nuclear or natural gas regionally have only made things worse. Russia is therefore in a unique position to deny Europe an essential ingredient to Europe's standard of living.

In other words, Moscow is a strategic beneficiary to the recent harm caused by the Nordex intrusion. Without waiting for attribution or the unlikely event of a digital trail to the attackers, strategists in countries across the world should be alarmed by this event. Cyber-war is moving out of its fledgling phase - where it is relegated as a tactical tool - into geopolitical maturity as a strategic threat. 

Lucas Kello, in his essay discussing the unique strategic space that cyber-war creates for itself, notes how cyber-warfare is offense-dominant. He argues that the costs of defending against an attacker are much higher than the costs of attacking an adversary. While I won't delve too much into his work, he is successful in his argument while addressing counter-points effectively. 

What this means for the geopolitical landscape is significant. Not only can a relatively weak Russia rely on its strategic nuclear weapons in times of catastrophe, attacks like the one on Nordex can prolong the slow deterioration of Russia's conventional posturing. Russia now has effective strategic tools below the threshold of nuclear war, enabling it to use a substantially cheaper cyber-offense to wrestle concessions out of all but the world's most cyber-capable and wealthy entities, both public and private. By using cyber-war to jeopardize adversarial energy independence, Russia can alter the conditions of a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty by way of the conflict's mediators. The ability for asymmetrical conflict to exist outside of ostensible war is significant for Russia, as well as other actors who have faced international condemnation. When the lights go out, who is to blame?